Top African philosophers

 African philosophers

African philosophers

Introduction

Philosophical counselling and diversity Shakespeare not with standing, there is more to philosophy than the reisin the the rapist’s heaven and earth (Gindi & Pilpel, 2015). While philosophy has been used by therapists, they have mostly concentrated upon areas of philosophy that are most obviously relevant to clinicalrealities. These include Socratic Dialogues (e.g. Achenbach, 1984;Cohen, 2003;Knox,2015; Raabe, 2009), Stoicism and Hellenistic phi-losophy (Schuster, 1999), and Existentialism (Su, 2015;Yalom,1981). We believe many other important fields of philosophy are underuti-lized by therapists.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY & COUNSELLING 3

Our interest, as the interest of counsellors who employ philosophy in their therapy, is to use philosophical methods to inquire about the agents’ philosophical views, and to examine them critically, in a way that is the rapeutically beneficial (Author & Author, 2015). Modern therapists know that some truths about the client, howeverobvious or important when observed from the outside, cannot be effec-tively treated by merely raising them, or by pointing out their flaws(Seligman, 1995). Nor is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) view ofHellenistic philosopher-therapists of the ‘correct’psychological makeupfor happiness sufficient for achieving it in practice. For Epictetus forexample, such a frame of mind would be awareness of the triviality orimaginary nature of many of our worries and concerns, which can lead tohappiness, attained by his methods of philosophical training (Epictetus,1909). The ancients were aware of the difficulties of using philosophy toinfluence one’s mental health. Epictetus himself explicitly noted that those who come to him seeking betterment must first have the correct attitude : if improvement is sought, his study should be a place of ‘pain, not pleasure ’ for those who come there, like aphysician’s orphysi caltrainer’s. Yet according to the modern understanding of an efficient counsellingprocess, such methods are insufficient.However, skepticism of the availability of the ‘correct’philosophicaltradition to be used with a client is also a way forward. If various philosophical fields are under utilized, the issue is which philosophical field is likely to be the most effective for a particular client. On the onehand, we caution that when you’re a hammer, all clients look like nails –i.e. when you are coming from a certain philosophical viewpoint ortherapeutic tradition, you tend to use it as a panacea for all clients.On the other hand, one should avoid a prescriptive attitude that assignsparticular philosophies to specific problems.Instead, we offer here a tentative starting point. When assessingclients, the counsellor should look for viewpoints that would fitthemin various ways: one that resonates with clients’worldviews, culturalbackgrounds, or –somewhat in the opposite direction –gives them freshinsights. If, for instance, the counsellor notices a significant similaritybetween the client’s general worldview and that of a certain philosophi-cal tradition which offers insights, possible solutions, or philosophicalproblems relevant to the issues the client feels a need to resolve, it wouldbe a natural starting point.In this paper we explore two rich philosophical traditions that, to ourknowledge, are virtually ignored in philosophical counselling: African andIslamic philosophy. We illustrate how these traditions can be useful forphilosophical counselling. Although these are not the only potentially useful4A. PILPEL AND S. GINDI

traditions, we employ them here as examples due to their considerableintellectual and cultural distance from the usual philosophical traditionsused in philosophical counselling, to show how their novel insights can bebeneficial in counselling.This notion has practical implications for European counsellors in parti-cular; recent immigrants to Europe have often been traumatized in their home countries (Carta, Bernal, Hardoy, & Haro-Abad, 2005; Hebebrand et al., 2016) and more on their journey to Europe. When added to the toll of immigration –known to be a highly stressful event (Bhugra, 2004; Holmes & Rahe, 1967)even in the best circum stances –it seems these immigrants will often be inneed of counselling. As such, the counsellor needs to be aware of the philo-sophical traditions that underlie many of their points of view. In addition, knowing the philosophical traditions many of the immigrants come from canhelp counsellors assist locals as well, as some native Europeans feel stressedand fearful due to the changing ethnic composition of their neigh borhood sand countries (Garner & Selod, 2015; Nussbaum, 2012). However, the clients’ethnicity or cultural background should not solely determine the type of philosophy that would be employed in philosophical counselling. To give a contemporary example, recent refugees from Syria orthe Sudan who come to philosophical counselling in a Western country neednot start the treatment with Islamic or African philosophy, any more thana Greek immigrant necessarily needs to start with Socrates or a woman with feminist philosophy. It is the philosophical coun sellor’s duty to under stand the individual client and to tailor the most suitable approach accordingly.The choice of the most relevant field is determined by an assessment ofthe client’s overall clinical picture, not their ethnicity. For example, philo-sophical counsellors must be knowledgeable in feminist philosophy when treating women who struggle with feelings of inadequacy. Similarly, weargue that the counsellor must have some knowledge of African and Islamic philosophy when treating African immigrants who are in a dilemma con-cerning their ethical duties toward their families after arriving in Europe. There fore, counsellors may find the under standing of immigrants’ world-views useful in supporting the therapeutic process; it can help clients tobetter under stand behaviors and customs that seem thre atening or incom-prehensible, or it may help engage clients who perceive significant differ-ences between Western and African/Muslim philosophy and ethics in aninvestigation of the similarities and differences between the two views,deepening the understanding of their own perspective.African philosophy: Ubuntu and sage philosophy(African philosophy) can mean many things. There are many Africans, andpeople of African descent, who work in the ‘traditional’Western EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY & COUNSELLING 5

philosophical tradition. These scholars and professionals are not only interested in African philosophy; there is also a unique development, Africana philosophy, which holds the ethics, meta physics, and general world view of non-traditional African societies, which developed as there sult of their oft-traumatic interaction (both in Africa itself and in the African diaspora) with European colonization (Out law, 2005). More over, traditional African societies have different meta physics, ethics, and values(Wiredu, 2005). This is in fact the view of most scholars, Africans and non-African. As Gyekye (1995) writes: I believe that in many areas of thought we can discern features of tradition allife and thought of the African peoples [that] constitute a legitimate andreasonable basic for the construction (or reconstruction) of a philosophicalsystem that may properly be called African –African not in the sense thatevery African adheres to it, but in the sense that the philosophical systemarises from, and hence is essentially related to, African life and thought (p.191).African philosophy is not limited to ethics. Oruka, whom we quote exten-sively below, defined ‘six trends’as central to African philosophy: ethno-philosophy, sage philosophy, nationalistic-ideological philosophy, profes-sional philosophy, hermeneutic philosophy, and artistic or literary philoso-phy (Hapayengwi-Chemhuru, 2013; Mawere & Mubaya, 2016).For illustrative purposes, we consider the term ‘African philosophy’tobe a general common denominator of the worldview of many traditionalAfricansocieties,inthesamesensethatonecanspeakof‘Continentalphilosophy’or ‘Chinese philosophy’(Wiredu, 2005). Of this wide field,we consider more specifically two examples that seem to have the mostobvious therapeutic potential: African ethics (i.e. African moral philoso-phy), and sage philosophy (Oruka, 1990)–the philosophy of those menconsidered wise in African societies, one of the subjects Oruka system-atically investigated. These are often quite different than European orWestern views.The central notion of African ethics is that of character, individuality, orpersonhood (ubuntu). In many African languages, saying a person has ‘nomorals’or ‘their behavior is unethical’is literally to say ‘they have nocharacter’in the sense of lacking individuality, much like a baby (Robert,1968). Acquiring a good (or even a bad) character in this sense is essentialto becoming a (good or bad) person –as opposed to a mere human being(as are, for instance, young children). This concept is central to everythingfrom environmentalism (Ramose, 2009) to business ethics (West, 2014).Menkiti (1984) is one of the important writers on this topic, which iscritiqued and further analyzed by Munyaka and Motlhabi (2009), as wellas Shutte (2009).6A. PILPEL AND S. GINDI

Thus, there is a strong and direct emphasis on the very notion of beinga person as depending on acting morally by fulfilling social obligations.This implies that character or personhood is essentially good, but at thesame time has to be earned with practice, and is not innate. This hasimplications for the differences between European and African expressionsof depression, as will be discussed later.Another important point is that for African ethics, the fulfilment ofsocial duties is not due to an absolute moral rule such as the categoricalimperative or the will of God. African ethics is humanistic: its essence is tofulfil one’s duties to others in society, and in particular, to help theunfortunate and those who are in trouble. ‘One can boldly affirm that thewellspring of morality and ethics in African societies is the pursuit ofa balance of individual, with communal, wellbeing’(Bewaji, 2005, p. 396).This morality is often in practice the same as that of the traditionalWestern one: all cultures emphasize the role of kindness and helping others.But in African ethics this duty is a central one, not a derivative one. One person should help another because part of being a person is to have a duty to help others in trouble –as opposed to the general view of Western philosophy, in which personhood is defined with far less reference (if at all)to others. It follows that there is in principle no limit to the degree of moralobligation to help others. In the Western tradition, if one person makes another happy, rich, educated, etc., it is a commendable deed, but nota moral duty. In African social-based ethics, so long as the help demandedis part of the other’s needs, it has no prede fined limit.Closely related to African ethics is African sage philosophy –the sayingof its traditional ‘wise men’on all subjects, ethics included. One of Oruka’sinterests was to speak to many sages of various African societies aboutphilosophy (e.g. ‘why do people lie?’,‘what is truth?’, etc.) and analyze theanswers using philosophical tools. The aim of his project was to show African sages have a unified and logical episte mology, and a significant ethical philosophy which is pursued with the use of ration ality and logic–not merely a collection of folk sayings or traditional expressions. (seeMasolo, 2016; Presbey, 2002 for detailed reviews).Sage philosophy also emphasizes the importance of communal duty. For example, when one person has cattle, say the sages, every body has cattle –i.e. every body is expected to help raise them, while the owner is expected to share the milk and meat. This communitarianism is quite different thanCommunism in the Western sense, in that it is based on different philoso-phical assumptions about the nature of community and one’s moral duties(Oruka, 1990). In sage philosophy, communal obligation relies upon thenotion of property and personhood itse. lf, not on deon tological moral dutiesas Kant would under stand them, or a theory of property that Marx woulden dorse. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY & COUNSELLING 7

Interpreting sage philosophy statements using Western terms can lead tomis conceptions; Oruka (1990) points out we need to be careful in translat-ing sage expressions or views into Western concepts. We learn from this, that the difficulties of translation and ethnocentrism are often of greats ignificance in practice, and not just in theory (e.g. Quine, 1960 problemof ‘radical translation’). We add that for Oruka, the description of African thought as lacking true philosophy –or for that matter, lacking reasonal together –is at least partially due to such problems in translation. It is the refore crucial for us as the rapists to be awar e of potential difficulties incommunication between the clients’ world view and that of their Western the rapists. Potential uses in philosophical counselling Under standing African philosophy has important implications for counsel-ling in general, and for European counsellors in particular. When a person’sconcept of personhood depends on their moral behavior toward others intheir community, it can have significant the rapeutic conse quences. Moreover, there may well be a need for a philosophical investigation ofthe person’s sayings, ‘folk’beliefs and the like, to under stand to what de gree they hold true. For instance, when the client may be unaware of the degree to which their concept of personhood is pivotal, a critical analysis (e.g. whether clients set limits on moral duties, and how the imposition of such limitsmay threaten one’s concept of personhood) is likely to be involved. Butunlike ‘traditional’(e.g. Hellenistic or Existentialist) philosophical counsel-ling in which the fulfillment of social functions may be seen as limiting inthe greater quest for truth and authenticity, African philosophy can acceptthe duty-based essence of personhood, and work within this tradition.Another example may be found in the treatment of depression. Asmentioned above, some scholars have distinguished ‘European depression’from ‘African depression’(Binitie, 1975; Wilson, Nancy, Wilson, & Daniel,2011). The feeling of worthless ness and guilt which is referred to as European depression, can often be linked inter alia to the essential view of man as a creature fallen from an ideal state. In contrast, African depres-sion is closely tied to a person’s position and contribution with in the community, and the need to take responsibility for their wrong doings. Inthe African world view, to heal is to become a person (as opposed to a mere human being, as it were), by doing right socially, thus restoring the essential moral component of one’s being.Let us take one idea of sage philosophy as an example of a possible philosophical solution to the problem of self-sacrifice. The previously noted African sage saying regarding the sharing of cattle illustrates two 8 A . PILPEL AND S. GINDI.